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a b s t r a c t
Westerners tend to judge themselves positively unless their failure relative to others is obvious, in which
case they tend to distance themselves from outperforming others. Whether this tendency to self-enhance
in social-comparison situations is universal or culture-bound is hotly debated. Rather than construe self-
enhancement as either universal or culture-bound, we propose that its effects depend on the cultural
mindset that is salient at the moment of self-reflection. A cultural mindset is a mental representation
containing culture-congruent content, procedures, and goals. We focused on individual and collective
mindsets, using language as an unobtrusive mindset prime and predicting that people would be more
self-enhancing when an individual mindset was made salient by using English than when a collective
mindset was made salient by using Chinese. Three studies supported this hypothesis. Chinese students
self-enhanced (rating themselves as better than others and distancing themselves from outperforming
others) more when primed with an individual mindset.
! 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
‘‘It was an important final exam. Very difficult. . . I really wanted
to take a look at her answers. . .. I fought with my evil spirit. At
last, I succeeded.” (Chinese college student, male, 19, recalling a
moment of moral struggle in elementary school)
Everyday moral struggles are common. Sometimes people suc-
ceed, other times they fail, in spite of their best efforts and others’
success. We are interested in how people judge themselves in
these success and failure situations. A large literature suggests that
the most common response, at least among North Americans and
Western Europeans, is to self-enhance, that is, to judge one’s
strengths as unique and to put distance between oneself and out-
performing others when one’s own failure cannot be denied (Leary,
2007). Indeed, some cultural psychologists view self-enhancement
as so pronounced in the West as to constitute a distinct phenome-
non central to individualistic societies (Heine & Hamamura, 2007;
Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, 2007a, 2007b). Others counter that
self-enhancement is a universal motive with cultures differing in
their tactics to achieve it—some self-enhancing on individualistic
attributes, others on collectivistic ones (Sedikides, Gaertner, &
Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005, 2007a,
2007b). We propose a reframing of the argument: Rather than
being fixed parts of either a particular culture or of human nature,
the quality and quantity of self-enhancing responses are depen-
dent on which cultural mindset is salient at the moment of self-
reflection. Three studies unobtrusively manipulate language use
to prime cultural mindsets and provide evidence that self-
enhancement occurs even in collectivistic societies when an indi-
vidual mindset is primed, showing effects on a variety of tasks.
Cultural mindsets
A cultural mindset is a mental representation or cognitive sche-
ma containing culture-congruent content, procedures, and goals
(Oyserman & Lee, 2008a; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen,
2009). Cultural psychologists have distinguished individualism
from collectivism (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi,
Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995),
and countries can be distinguished on these axes (Oyserman, Coon,
& Kemmelmeier, 2002). This implies that core cultural mindsets
differentiate individualistic and collectivistic cultural perspectives.
Specifically, an individual mindset involves content (being positive
about the self, standing out), procedures (contrasting, separating),
and goals (striving for individual success) that differ from those of
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a collective mindset (being modest about the self, fitting in; assim-
ilating, connecting; striving for relational harmony, collective well-
being).
To understand how cultural mindsets matter for self-enhance-
ment, we focus on traits and domains in which people would likely
prefer success to failure. We propose that cultural mindsets shift
the meaning attributed to one’s successes and failures and there-
fore which behaviors are likely when one fails (despite one’s best
efforts) in the face of others’ success. Within an individual mindset,
salient self-uniqueness content, self-positivity goals and contrast-
ing procedures together support a sense of one’s distinctive success
relative to others (e.g., ‘‘I am uniquely able to avoid this tempta-
tion; many of my peers would have cheated”). When failure cannot
be mitigated by claiming that it is common (‘‘it’s not just me;
everybody did that”), uniqueness content coupled with a positivity
goal and a contrasting procedure would facilitate distancing from
others to reduce the salience of failure.
Conversely, within a collective mindset, relatedness content
coupled with salient self-modesty goals and assimilating proce-
dures together support a sense of the commonness of one’s success
(e.g., ‘‘we are all able to do this”). In the case of failure when others
have succeeded, a modesty goal and an assimilating procedure
would render a distancing response irrelevant. Modesty goals
and assimilating procedures do not make failure unimportant,
but render the distancing response irrelevant, because successful
others imply that success is possible (modesty) and putting dis-
tance between self and others is not the procedure that comes to
mind (assimilation).
Cultural psychologists generally assume that societies differ in
which mindset is socialized (Nisbett, 2003) and that only bicultur-
als, having lived in more than one society, develop both mindsets
(Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). Following Schwartz
(1992), we disagree with this formulation. To survive over time,
societies must socialize members to be able to get along; to thrive,
societies must socialize members to be able to choose their own
way when resources allow. Thus, both individual success and rela-
tional harmony are pursued (albeit to varying degrees) and socie-
ties socialize for both individual and collective mindsets, though
one or the other may be more commonly or more strongly cued
(Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & Coon, 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2007,
2008a; Oyserman et al., 2009). Once learned, a mindset can be non-
consciously primed to influence culturally-relevant psychological
processes and outcomes (e.g., social behaviors, values, beliefs,
judgments, self-concept content, basic perceptual processes).
These have been demonstrated with various primes such as
describing oneself as similar to or different from friends and fam-
ily, imagining oneself playing singles or doubles tennis, or simply
circling singular or plural pronouns (for a meta-analytic review
of experimental techniques and evidence, see Oyserman & Lee,
2008b).
Language as a prime of cultural mindset
The fact that cultural mindsets can be readily primed by diverse
contextual cues led us to hypothesize that language, an important
cultural marker, could also be a potent mindset prime. Knowing a
language is not just about knowing which words to use and how to
put them together, but also knowing what to say in what context.
Research on bilinguals has provided some evidence that language
can prime mindset (for reviews, Chiu, Leung, & Kwan, 2007; Oyser-
man & Lee, 2007, 2008a). For example, bilinguals randomly as-
signed to use either one language (e.g., English) or another (e.g.,
Chinese) systematically differ in whether their recollections about
autobiographical events (e.g., a birthday party) focus on them-
selves (what they were doing, thinking or feeling) or others in
the context (who were there, what was happening; Marian & Neis-
ser, 2000). Moreover, bilinguals randomly assigned to use English
tended to group objects on the basis of category membership,
whereas those assigned to use Chinese grouped objects more on
the basis of their relationships (Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett, 2004).
In the current studies, we propose an expansion of the general
idea that using different languages can prime different cultural
mindsets. Because mindsets include content, process, and goals,
we predict that language use should not only affect how positive
self-descriptions are, but should also produce differences in rele-
vant procedures and goals. Specifically, using a language that
primes an individual mindset should trigger use of a contrasting
procedure – contrasting oneself with others (cf. Kwan, John, Kenny,
Bond, & Robins, 2004) – and a self-enhancement goal with the
behavioral consequence of distancing oneself from successful oth-
ers when failure cannot be hidden (Tesser, 2000). Using a language
that primes a collective mindset should trigger use of an assimilat-
ing procedure, relating and connecting oneself with others and a
self-improvement or self-modesty goal with the behavioral conse-
quence that one does not need to distance oneself from successful
others when failure cannot be hidden.
This intuitive, perhaps even obvious, prediction has not been
rigorously tested due to several limitations in prior research
involving language. Studies typically conflate language and society,
as can be seen by examining studies in Heine and Hamamura’s
(2007) comprehensive meta-analysis demonstrating cross-na-
tional differences in self-enhancing responses. Such conflation
makes it impossible to tell if seemingly fixed, between-society dif-
ferences were in fact primed by language. This shortcoming was
addressed by Ross, Xun, andWilson (2002) who randomly assigned
Chinese-born students living in Canada to answer a questionnaire
in English or Chinese, and found that those using English rather
than Chinese wrote more positive self-descriptions and reported
higher self-esteem. This finding is clearly relevant to the case we
would like to make for language as a cultural mindset prime. How-
ever, because they assessed self-evaluations without inducing so-
cial comparison or failure, they did not address the larger
question we raise about mindsets cuing content (positivity vs.
modesty), process (contrasting and separating procedures vs.
assimilating and connecting procedures) and goals (being better
than others vs. fitting in with others). We address this question
in the current studies.
With the exception of the research by Ross and colleagues
(2002), the literature to date has not found a strong or consistent
effect of experimentally manipulated language use on value-
endorsements and self-descriptions. The overall effect of language
in a recent meta-analysis of cultural mindset priming studies was
small (d = .10) and its confidence interval included both positive
and negative effects (Oyserman & Lee, 2008b). One possible rea-
son for these mixed results is that studies differed in whether
participant’s attention was drawn to the language they were
using in the context of the experiment. When participant’s atten-
tion is drawn to language use, they are likely to attempt to cor-
rect for their understanding of the likely effects of language use
on their responses. The assumption that people try to correct
for likely effects of situational factors that their attention is
drawn to is rooted in a large body of social cognition research.
This research demonstrates first, that people are sensitive to sub-
tle shifts in context, responding differently as context changes,
and second, that when people are made aware of context, they at-
tempt to correct for its effects but often overcorrect, resulting in
the kind of variance in effects currently seen in the language-
priming literature (for reviews of correction and overcorrection
effects, see Forster & Liberman, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 2007;
Wilson & Brekke, 1994). To test the naturalistic effects of lan-
guage as a subtle cue, its use has to be an unobtrusive feature
in the experiment.
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The present research
We unobtrusively manipulated language and directly tested
whether the language used shifts self-enhancement, turning it on
or off. A language that primes an individual mindset (but not one
that primes a collective mindset) should produce self-enhancing
judgments and behaviors. We chose English and Chinese as our
exemplar languages for two reasons: Meta-analytic results suggest
that English-speaking peoples are more individualistic than others,
even Western Europeans who speak other languages (Oyserman,
Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Moreover, Chinese culture is a good
example of East-Asian collectivism, the most common contrast to
Western individualism, and a regional root civilization whose lan-
guage, traditions, and beliefs influenced neighboring countries
such as Japan and Korea (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan,
2001; Stearns, Adas, Schwartz, & Gilbert, 2004).
We conducted our studies in a Hong Kong university setting,
where both English and Chinese are commonly used, allowing for
unobtrusive manipulation of language and ecological validity. We
varied social-comparison contexts across studies to increase the
generalizability of findings, predicting that participants randomly
assigned to use English (vs. Chinese) would make more self-
enhancing social-comparative judgments (Studies 1 and 2) and
show more social distancing after underperformance if not given
an alternative way to protect their positive self-regard (Study 3).
English versions of materials are presented in this paper; Chi-
nese versions are available from the first author. All predictions
were directional, a priori, and evaluated with one-tailed signifi-
cance tests (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000).
Study 1: better-than-average
Self-enhancement, operationalized as the tendency to rate
desirable traits as more self-defining and undesirable traits as
more defining of the average student (Alicke, 1985; Taylor &
Brown, 1994), was hypothesized to be stronger when participants
were randomly assigned to use English (vs. Chinese). We tested
this hypothesis using ratings on traits from prior self-enhancement
research, Confucian values, and the Ten Commandments. Follow-
ing Alicke (1985), controllable and clearly desirable or undesirable
traits were used to maximize the ‘‘better-than-average” effect.
Methods
Participants and procedure
Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) students in two intro-
ductory psychology courses (n = 99, 38 men, age M = 19.25,
SD = 0.96) participated in a class research exercise. In each course,
one discussion section was randomly assigned to hear, read, and
write in English, the other section to hear, read, and write in Chi-
nese. Participants were unaware that sections differed in language
used.
Measures
Participants rated 46 traits (‘‘Rate the extent to which each trait
describes you relative to the average CUHK student. This trait de-
scribes me. . . (1 =much less than. . ., 5 = about the same as. . .,
9 =much more than. . .) the average CUHK student”; Alicke, 1985).
About the same number of traits were desirable (24; e.g., consider-
ate, knowing shame, revering seniors, honoring parents) as unde-
sirable (22; e.g., phony, narrowly self-interested, envious,
desiring your friend’s partner). Ratings for undesirable traits were
reverse-coded so that higher overall scores reflected greater self-
enhancement (i.e., seeing desirable traits as more self-descriptive
and undesirable traits as more others-descriptive).
Analysis
Preliminary analyses showed no gender-ratio, age, and trait-rat-
ing differences between courses (all ns), but found weak effects of
gender and college-standing on trait-ratings.1 To control for these
effects, we submitted the self-enhancement scores to a 2 (Lan-
guage) ! 2 (Desirability) mixed ANCOVA, with Language as a be-
tween-participants factor, Desirability as a within-participants
factor, gender and college-standing as covariates.
Results and discussion
As predicted, language condition influenced self-enhancement.
Participants randomly assigned to use English (M = 5.65,
SD = 0.65) reported significantly more self-enhancement than par-
ticipants randomly assigned to use Chinese (M = 5.44, SD = 0.78),
F(1, 95) = 3.55, p = .03, d = 0.29. Effects were consistent across
desirable and undesirable traits (Language ! Desirability F = 0.93,
ns; see Table 1 and Fig. 1) and went beyond the general tendency
to rate desirable traits as self-descriptive (tested against scale-mid-
point, English t(51) = 10.94, p < .001; Chinese t(46) = 7.23, p < .001).
The tendency to rate undesirable traits as others-descriptive was
evident among participants randomly assigned to use English
(t(51) = 3.31, p = .001), but not among those randomly assigned
to use Chinese (t(46) = 0.74, ns). These effects were not moderated
by gender (Fs < .02, ns) or cultural indigenousness of traits (Confu-
cian vs. non-Confucian; Fs < 1.48, ns).
Results suggest that unobtrusive shift in language influenced
self-enhancement, with similar effect sizes whether traits were
desirable or undesirable, culturally indigenous or non-indigenous.
Using a standardized set of traits had the advantage that all partic-
ipants rated themselves on the same traits, but the disadvantage
that participants might not have found all traits particularly self-
relevant. To address this limitation, Study 2 adopted an idiographic
approach (Allport, 1962), first having participants describe a moral
success or failure of their own, then asking them whether others
would have behaved as they had.
Study 2: ‘‘holier-than-thou’’
Self-enhancement, operationalized as the tendency to see one’s
moral successes as unique and moral failures as common (Suls &
Wan, 1987), was hypothesized to be stronger among participants
randomly assigned to use English (vs. Chinese). We tested this
hypothesis by asking participants to think of a time when they re-
sisted (or succumbed to) temptation, write about it, then rate how
unique or common their response to temptation was.
Methods
Participants and procedure
CUHK introductory psychology students (n = 76, 25 men, age
M = 19.16, SD = 0.87) participated. Language was manipulated as
in Study 1. In each section, students were randomly assigned to
write about a moral success or a moral failure: ‘‘Recall an incident
in your life where you struggled to do the right thing and eventu-
ally stood firm and succeeded in doing the right thing (or gave in and
failed to do the right thing).. . . Focus on your feelings and emotions
while experiencing the struggle and success (or failure).” Partici-
pants wrote for 5 min, then rated the uniqueness of their response.
1 Women scored higher on desirable, F(1, 94) = 5.18, p = .03, but not undesirable
traits, F(1, 94) = 1.09, p = .30. Seniors scored higher on undesirable, b = .28,
t(94) = 1.91, p = .06, but not desirable traits, b = ".04, t(94) = "0.42, p = .68.
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Measures
Participants were asked ‘‘How well do you think an average
CUHK student would do in the same situation you described
above?”, and responded on a 9-point scale: ‘‘An average CUHK stu-
dent would be. . . (1 =much less likely than me. . ., 5 = just as likely as
me. . ., 9 =much more likely than me) . . .to stand firm and succeed (or
give in and fail)”. Rating was reverse-coded in the success condition
so that higher scores reflected greater self-enhancement (i.e., oth-
ers are either less likely to resist temptation or more likely to suc-
cumb to temptation).
Analysis
Preliminary analyses showed no effect of gender or college-
standing, so neither variable was included in analyses. Self-
enhancement scores were submitted to a 2 (Language) ! 2 (Moral-
ity) between-participants ANOVA.
Results and discussion
As predicted, language condition influenced self-enhancement.
Participants randomly assigned to use English (M = 6.18,
SD = 1.64) reported significantly more self-enhancement than par-
ticipants randomly assigned to use Chinese (M = 5.33, SD = 1.49),
F(1, 72) = 5.49, p = .01, d = 0.54. Effects were consistent across mor-
al success and failure (Language !Morality F = 0.37, ns; see Table 1
and Fig. 2) and went beyond the general tendency to perceive one’s
moral successes as unique (tested against scale-midpoint, English
t(16) = 3.93, p < .001; Chinese t(19) = 1.71, p = .05). The general
tendency to perceive one’s moral failures as common was evident
among participants randomly assigned to use English (t(16) = 2.02,
p = .03), but not among those randomly assigned to use Chinese
(t(21) = 0.30, ns). These effects were not driven by different moral
experience in participants’ stories, as content-analysis revealed
no differences across conditions in their thematic content (most
commonly, academic situations) or in whether their emotional
experience was interpersonally engaged (e.g., respectful) or disen-
gaged (e.g., proud; Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000).
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that language can be a cultural
mindset prime that amplifies or diminishes self-enhancement in
social comparisons. Both studies suggest that previously found
cross-national differences in self-enhancement can be attributed
at least in part to the salient cultural mindsets primed by the lan-
guage used in context. In Study 3, we continued to focus on person-
ally important experience by capitalizing on the most common
theme in participants’ idiographic accounts, their academic perfor-
mance. To reduce heterogeneity and increase vividness, we stan-
dardized the situation and focused on performance in situ (rather
than recall and judgment, as in Studies 1 and 2).
Study 3 extended beyond Studies 1 and 2 in several other re-
spects as well. First, in Studies 1 and 2, participants could simply
rate themselves as better than others without ever thinking about
what reality was and whether they truly were better. Study 3
Table 1
Self-enhancement (Studies 1 and 2) and social distancing (Study 3): Cell sizes, means, and standard deviations by mindset prime and condition.
Study Dependent variable Condition Mindset prime
English Chinese
n M SD n M SD d
Study 1 Self-enhancement score Desirable traits 52 5.91 0.60 47 5.77 0.73 0.21
Undesirable traitsa 5.39 0.85 5.11 1.02 0.30
Study 2 Self-enhancement score Moral successb 17 6.65 1.73 20 5.60 1.57 0.64
Moral failure 17 5.71 1.45 22 5.09 1.41 0.43
Study 3 Felt closeness to outperforming peers Not self-affirmed 47 3.47 1.69 38 5.11 1.87 0.92
Self-affirmed 45 4.27 1.66 44 4.55 1.84 0.16
Note: Mindset prime is between-participants in all studies. Condition is within-participants in Study 1 and between-participants in Studies 2 and 3. d = Effect size of the
mindset prime.
a The scale was ‘‘This trait describes me . . . (1 =much less than. . ., 5 = about the same as. . ., 9 =much more than. . .) the average CUHK student.” Ratings were reverse-coded for
undesirable traits, so a higher score for any trait meant greater self-enhancement (i.e., rating desirable traits as more self-descriptive and undesirable traits as more others-
descriptive).
b The scale was ‘‘An average CUHK student would be . . . (1 =much less likely than me. . ., 5 = just as likely as me. . ., 9 =much more likely than me) . . . to stand firm and succeed
(or give in and fail).” Rating was reverse-coded in the success condition, so a higher score in both conditions meant greater self-enhancement (i.e., seeing others as less likely to
resist temptation or more likely to succumb to temptation).
Fig. 1. Study 1: Self-enhancement (seeing desirable traits as more self-descriptive
and undesirable traits as more others-descriptive) as a function of mindset prime
and trait desirability. Note: Error bar represents standard error of the mean. Higher
self-enhancement scores reflect higher agreement that desirable traits are self-
descriptive and lower agreement that undesirable traits are self-descriptive.
Fig. 2. Study 2: Self-enhancement (seeing others are less likely to resist temptation
or more likely to succumb to temptation) as a function of mindset prime and moral
success or failure condition. Note: Error bar represents standard error of the mean.
Higher self-enhancement scores reflect higher agreement that a recalled moral
success is unique and lower agreement that a recalled moral failure is unique.
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removed this option by giving participants clear feedback that they
had performed worse than others, and tested whether this
prompted social distancing. Second, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated
self-enhancing outcomes, but were not tests of process. Study 3
used a moderation-of-process design (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong,
2005). Half of participants (but not the other half) were given an
opportunity to buttress their self-worth, a procedure that should
remove the need to protect self-worth through social distancing.
Third, to demonstrate the breadth of cultural mindset priming ef-
fects, Study 3 sought to replicate prior findings that language can
prime individual-focused vs. relation-focused self-descriptions
(Kemmelmeier & Cheng, 2004; Ross et al., 2002; Trafimow,
Silverman, Fan, & Law, 1997).
Study 3: negative social comparison and self-affirmation
Self-enhancing behavior, operationalized as the tendency to
distance oneself from outperforming others (Tesser, 2000), was
hypothesized to be stronger among participants randomly as-
signed to use English (vs. Chinese). But if self-worth was buffered,
no distancing would be expected. We tested this hypothesis by giv-
ing participants failure feedback that set up a clear negative con-
trast with other participants. Half of the participants were given
a chance to buffer self-worth through a self-affirmation manipula-
tion, half were not.
Unfavorable social comparison (discovering that one performed
worse than others) in an important domain is widely used to study
self-enhancement, because it undermines the ability to perceive
oneself as positively distinct (Tesser, 2000). If self-worth is based
in part on positive contrast from others, an unfavorable compari-
son should threaten self-worth and instigate attempts to regain
it. One way to regain self-worth is to make the unfavorable com-
parison less salient, so people distance themselves from clearly
outperforming others (Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & Beach,
2000)—unless self-worth is protected through other means such
as affirming core values (for reviews, see Sherman & Cohen,
2006; Steele, 1988).
Methods
Participants and procedure
CUHK students (n = 174, 68 men, age M = 20.60, SD = 1.44) par-
ticipated in groups of 12–20 in a computer lab. Each was seated
individually. Language manipulation followed Studies 1 and 2,
with an added manipulation check of language effects on salient
self-concept content. Participants wrote 20 self-descriptive state-
ments (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), and then were randomly as-
signed to one of two self-affirmation conditions (self-affirmed,
control). Self-affirmed participants completed Tesser and col-
league’s (2000) value-ranking task2 before proceeding to the threat-
ening math test. Control participants proceeded directly to the math
test.
The test was described as having been validated by the School
of Education and predictive of reasoning ability and course grades.
It included six difficult math questions pre-tested to feel solvable
with sufficient time. However, participants did not have sufficient
time. We gave participants only 15 s per question, creating uncer-
tainty about answers because their computations were only nearly
complete when they had to respond. After the test, participants
waited 5 s while the computer appeared to be processing answers
and creating statistics. They then received the bogus feedback,
‘‘Your number of correct answers is 2 out of 6. The average number
of correct answers among participants who have completed the
test so far in this classroom is 3.7 out of 6.”
Measures
Participants reported how close they felt to the other students
taking the test (1 = not close at all, 9 = very close) and as a compar-
ison, to their friends in general. As manipulation checks, they also
reported how they performed relative to other students (1 =much
worse, 9 =much better) and how they felt after completing the test
(1 = bad, 9 = good).
Manipulation checks
Content-coding of self-descriptions (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto,
1991) confirmed more individual-trait content in English (89%)
than in Chinese (84%), more relational-collective content in Chi-
nese (16%) than in English (11%), t(171) = 2.49, p = .01, d = 0.38.
The failure feedback was effective: all participants reported per-
forming worse than others (M = 3.20, SD = 1.16) and feeling bad
(M = 2.86, SD = 1.61). Both means were significantly below the
scale-midpoint, t(173)s = 17.47 and 20.49, ps < .001.
Analysis
Preliminary analyses showed no effect of gender or college-
standing, so neither variable was included in analyses. The two
closeness scores (to other students taking the test and to friends)
were submitted to a 2 (Language) ! 2 (Self-Affirmation) ! 2 (Tar-
get) mixed ANOVA. Language and Self-Affirmation were be-
tween-participants; Target was within-participants.
Results and discussion
As predicted, language condition influenced concern about self-
worth. Participants randomly assigned to use English felt more
distant from their outperforming peers than did participants ran-
domly assigned to use Chinese, F(1, 170) = 18.17, p < .001. Lan-
guage condition had a sizeable effect when self-worth was at
stake (d = 0.92), but its effect was completely eliminated when
self-worth was protected by affirmation, F(1, 170) = 0.56, ns (see
Table 1 and Fig. 3 left-panel), yielding a significant Language !
Self-Affirmation interaction, F(1, 170) = 6.43,p = .01. Self-affirmation
significantly reduced the social distancing response of participants
randomly assigned to use English (F = 4.73, p = .02, d = 0.48), but
had no significant effect on participants randomly assigned to
use Chinese (F = 2.06, ns).
No matter which language or affirmation condition they were
assigned to, participants always reported feeling close to friends
(Ms. from 6.18 to 6.39; main and interaction effects Fs < 0.24, ns;
Fig. 3 right-panel). Thus, the social distancing response specifically
targeted outperforming peers (who posed a threat to one’s self-
worth), but not friends (who posed no such threat); in contrast,
how close participants felt to outperforming peers was dependent
on language and self-affirmation conditions, yielding the predicted
Language ! Self-Affirmation ! Target interaction (F(1, 170) = 3.97,
p = .02; see Fig. 3).
General discussion
Three studies support our hypothesis that language can func-
tion as a cultural mindset prime, turning on or off the tendency
to positively contrast oneself from others whenmaking social com-
parison-based judgments (Studies 1 and 2) and to distance oneself
from outperforming others unless self-worth has been protected
(Study 3). Our results demonstrate that language has a causal im-
pact on judgment and behavior when it is an unobtrusive feature of
2 Participants ranked 18 values (e.g., an exciting life, a world at peace) in order of
personal importance, then detailed their rationale for choosing one important value
(the one they ranked fifth).
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the immediate context and primes cultural mindset. Effect sizes
range from small (d = 0.29), to moderate (d = 0.54), to large
(d = 0.92), increasing as dependent variables became more person-
ally relevant and the experimental context became more vivid; the
largest effects were found when an actual social comparison was
instantiated in an important domain (academic performance).
Our findings clearly go beyond prior research (Ross et al., 2002)
by demonstrating effects of language use in social-comparison sit-
uations. Our results also shed light on the previously unexplored
issue of the contingencies of cultural mindset priming effects
(see Oyserman & Lee, 2008b), suggesting that subjectively impor-
tant outcomes, rather than being unsusceptible to contextual influ-
ence, are strongly affected by contextual cues that prime cultural
mindsets.
Prior research has found that when content and procedure are
both primed, they can have multiplicative effects (e.g., on percep-
tual readiness; Forster & Liberman, 2007). This notion has two
implications for cultural mindset effects on self-enhancement.
First, effects should be more pronounced when all aspects of the
individual mindset (content, procedure, and goal) are salient and
relevant to the situation, as they were in Study 3, which showed
the largest effects. Second, effects should be more pronounced in
contexts that focus on comparisons because contrasting and assim-
ilating procedures are inherent in comparisons, but not necessarily
relevant in contexts that do not involve comparisons. Future re-
search using language and other cultural mindset primes may well
find that priming an individual mindset increases self-enhance-
ment particularly when framed in comparative terms that involve
contrasting procedures (e.g., ‘‘better-than-average”, Alicke, 1985;
‘‘better-than-I-was-before”, Wilson & Ross, 2001). When self-
enhancement does not explicitly involve a contrasting procedure
(e.g., taking more responsibility for success than failure, Blaine &
Crocker, 1993; skepticism about unflattering feedback, Ditto & Lo-
pez, 1992), cultural mindset priming effects may be weaker.
Whether self-enhancement is a culturally contingent phenome-
non (Heine & Buchtel, 2009; Heine & Hamamura, 2007; Heine
et al., 2007a, 2007b) or a pancultural phenomenon (Sedikides
et al., 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) is hotly debated. But neither per-
spective appears to predict our findings. Heine and colleagues ar-
gue that self-enhancement is a uniquely Western phenomenon,
unobservable among East Asians. Our studies document self-
enhancing judgments and behaviors among people in Hong Kong.
More importantly, within this single cultural group, self-enhancing
tendencies vary as a function of which cultural mindset is salient at
the moment of judgment. Such variability is not predicted by the
culturally contingent perspective, which assumes a cultural group
to be either self-enhancing or not self-enhancing.
Sedikides and colleagues argue from a pancultural viewpoint
that people in all cultures self-enhance, but do so by focusing on
different domains. Independent people self-enhance on individual-
istic attributes; interdependent people self-enhance on collectivis-
tic attributes. Cultural mindset priming effects are also not
predicted in this account. Our findings suggest that even people
socialized in collectivistic contexts can self-enhance when an indi-
vidual mindset is primed and that self-enhancement is not limited
to collectivistic attributes. Across three studies, language functions
as a cultural mindset prime and shifts people’s tendencies to self-
enhance across a variety of tasks. Study 1 also shows that cultural
mindset priming affects endorsement of culturally indigenous,
Confucianism-based, more collectivistic traits as well as non-indig-
enous, more individualistic traits. Therefore, cultural mindset
priming can promote self-enhancement in general, rather than
self-enhancement on a particular kind of attributes.
As a corollary, we would predict similar mindset priming effects
even among Americans. For example, after circling singular pro-
nouns (I,me) rather than plural pronouns (we, us), Americans
should show a stronger tendency to self-enhance on both individ-
ualistic and collectivistic attributes. While we used language as a
naturalistic prime, an important next step will be to demonstrate
the same effects for ‘‘Westerners,” whose chronic tendency to
self-enhance should be curtailed when a collective mindset is sali-
ent. A limitation of using naturalistic primes such as language is
that it is difficult to parse the specific process cued. Other less nat-
uralistic primes such as thinking about differences from vs. simi-
larities to family and friends (Trafimow et al., 1991), circling
singular vs. plural pronouns (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner,
Gabriel, & Lee, 1999) or seeing posters promoting individual
vs. group pursuits (Zhu & Meyers-Levy, 2009) can be useful in
specifying the process by testing ‘‘active ingredients” in naturalis-
tic primes.
That said, our results provide an important first step by demon-
strating that self-enhancement can be easily turned on and off by
priming cultural mindsets. Our results also raise the possibility of
reframing the universal vs. culturally contingent debate: rather
than conceptualizing self-enhancement as either universal or con-
tingent, or as either about individualistic content or about collec-
tivistic content, a more fruitful question to address is, ‘‘In which
contexts is self-enhancement activated?” This reframing within
cultural psychology represents a paradigm shift that resembles
the Nature–Nurture debate and its new focus. Genetic effects are
now known to manifest only when triggered by environmental fac-
tors, so the same gene pool can produce different phenotypes in
different environments (e.g., Mischel, Champagne, Meaney, &
Sokolowski, 2009). Phenotypes result from neither nature alone
nor nurture alone. Likewise, self-enhancement is not either
universal or contingent. It is both universal (in that it is observable
across societies) and contingent (in that it is observed only in the
right contexts and activated by the right cues, whose relative
Fig. 3. Study 3: Felt closeness to outperforming peers (left-panel) and friends (right-panel) as a function of mindset prime and self-affirmation condition. Note: Error bar
represents standard error of the mean.
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prominence differs by culture; see also Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).
Contexts and cues are what produce cultural differences in self-
enhancement. They hold promise of becoming the new paradigm
of theorizing and research in cultural psychology.
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